Squeezed Out: The Kleptogarchy part 24

Squeezed Out

Farmland in Eastern England in 2021 cost about £8,410 an acre and in South East England £8,390 an acre, according to the agents Savills. Great Britain’s cheapest farmland was on average £5,460 an acre in Wales, where companies are now eyeing upland farms for tree planting as potential carbon sinks. Savills commented that “Investment in farmland is seen as a hedge against increasing inflation and we may see investors looking to diversify their portfolios with agricultural assets.”[1] Large productive farms in the UK sell for millions of pounds, one of their attractions being the easy exemption from Inheritance Tax at 40%. Within the UK, Europe, North America and across the industrialised world, most people live in cities. The rural population in the UK, for example, all those living in countryside areas and not just farmers, was 16% in 2018, and in the USA 17%.[2] In a locally provisioned world, a revival of small farms is surely essential.

Local authorities in the UK used to provide small ‘county farms’ for new entrants, but most of this land has been sold off as councils struggled to make ends meet. The acreage of county farms in England halved in the 40 years to 2018, an investigation by Who Owns England has found:[3]

“County Farms are farms owned by Local Authorities and let out to young and first-time farmers, sometimes at below-market rents. They’re a vital ‘first rung on the farming ladder’ for newcomers to a sector that has high up-front capital costs: by providing the land and buildings, the public sector is helping get fresh blood into an industry where the average age of farmers is 60.

“Yet the acreage of County Farms across England has plummeted from 426,695 acres in 1977 to just 215,155 acres in 2017.”

The investigation explained that:

“The origins of County Farms lie in the late-Victorian agricultural depression, during which widespread cries for land reform led radical Liberal MP Joseph Chamberlain to stand for election on the promise of “three acres and a cow” for landless tenant farmers. He went on to propose a solution whereby councils would buy up land and lease it out to small tenant farmers on cheap rents. A succession of government Acts in 1892, 1908 and 1925 created County Farms, sometimes called County Smallholdings.”

It all went wrong in the 1980s:

“Fundamentally, the problem is central government cuts to local authority budgets. …the period of decline has coincided with the era of privatisation, cuts and centralisation ushered in by Margaret Thatcher’s governments in the 1980s, and accelerated under the austerity budgets of the Coalition and current government.”

The county farm entry road has become a narrow path indeed.

In Wales, a planning policy called One Planet Development allows people who own or buy land to build a home on it, subject to strict conditions. It is popular with applicants but less so with councillors sitting on planning committees. Here is an example from Carmarthenshire, dating from 2016.

Alwyn B Nixon, Planning Inspector, allowed on appeal a mini eco-hamlet of four homes on 21.5 acres at Rhiw Las, Abbey Road, Whitland. The original planning application, from Rhiw Las Ltd’s Dr Erica Thompson, was submitted under Wales’ One Planet policy for sustainable development in the countryside. Her application was refused by Carmarthenshire County Council’s planning committee, who went against the advice of planning officers. There was an extra sting in the tail for the planning committee – Erica Thompson reported that the council was required to pay the full costs of the appeal.

One Planet policy allows new land-based live-and-work enterprises in the countryside provided that detailed rules are followed. The guiding principle is to use very small amounts of finite resources, and to rely on renewable resources which planet Earth can continuously provide.

The reasons that councillors gave for rejecting Rhiw Las Ltd’s application included their personal opinions that occupants would fail to make a sufficient living, that they could live elsewhere and work on the land during the day, that it would encourage similar applications, and that it was too far from a village. Committee members then asked the planning department to come up with valid reasons for rejecting the plan. In the end, planning officers extracted three policies from the 2014 Carmarthenshire Local Development Plan and applied them to the One Planet policy in such a way as to make it very unlikely that any One Planet application for a rural location could ever be approved in the county.

At the behest of the critical councillors, planning officers suggested that the proposed site, 3.5 miles from Whitland and 2.2 miles from Llanboidy, was inadequately served by an integrated transport network catering for pedestrians, cyclists and public-transport users, and so conflicted with policy ‘GP1’ of the Local Development Plan. They said there was also a conflict with policy ‘TR2’, because the site was too remote from public transport, and was accessed from a road which lacked a pedestrian pathway. They also cited policy ‘TR3’, requiring public transport to be accessible.

Erica Thompson lost no time in appealing against the refusal, and she was vindicated when the appeal was allowed.

Alwyn B Nixon said in his decision: “It is clear that there is some scepticism amongst local community representatives as to the feasibility of the proposals; also a concern that such development will fail to integrate with the wider community. However, I find that the proposals are supported by a detailed development programme which fully meets the specific requirements laid out in Welsh Government guidance for their consideration of land-based OPD (One Planet Development) in the countryside.”

In response to councillors’ concerns over accessibility and public transport, the inspector concluded that “the development would be acceptably located as regards as regards its accessibility to local facilities and the availability of alternatives for sustainable travel options” and “it accords with the provisions of the development plan, so far as material to the development concerned, in this respect”.

Mr Nixon continued: “I am aware that some opponents of the proposal feel it unfair that development of this kind can be permitted in the countryside, whilst strict controls apply to the location of other housing. Ultimately, however, determination of the acceptability of this proposal rests on an objective consideration of its own planning merits, assessed in the context of the One Planet Development policy”.

Erica Thompson and husband Chris Vernon had formidable intellectual resources to draw on during their battle with the council’s planning committee. Erica, a PhD in physics, is Senior Policy Fellow in the Data Science Institute at the London School of Economics, and Chris, with a glaciology PhD, is a climate scientist and an engineer. If they are convinced of the urgent need to live differently, why is there still so much resistance? Tess Delaney experienced this resistance. She tried to start a One Planet Development in Pembrokeshire. She failed to convince the planning authority, a tale related in her book NOPD. Pete Linnell, buildings and energy sustainability consultant, wrote an appendix in which he commented (p.181):

“Legal remedy is only available to those with spare resources which can be put at great risk by court action. Consequently, those with limited means do not have access to all the options available to secure an OPD consent in the face of determined local opposition.”

Pete Linnell’s analysis also questioned the lack of seriousness with which the planning authority and then the planning inspector treated the management plan prepared by Ms Delaney as a central part of her application. He quoted (p.187) the inspector’s report as stating that:

“Appellant has produced the Management Plan herself, and I cannot rely on the information in it unless it is backed by clear evidence to support the various assertions made. In this respect the Management Plan is deficient in a number or elements.”

Yet the inspector also said:

“Some planting and growing has already taken place in 2018 and 2019, and the Appellant has used the results of these trials to help make projections of future production levels at the end of a 5-year period.”

Somewhat contradictory statements? True, Tess Delaney was not a professional horticulturist, but that is not a condition of receiving planning permission under the One Planet Development scheme.

Tess was defeated. Local authorities have vastly more resources at their disposal than the average resident like Tess. Elsewhere, I have seen expensive resources like lawyers used to silence critics whose assertions were regarded by officialdom as untrue. Protection of the institution (and thus of themselves) has been more important to some senior officials than the rights of wronged or ignored individuals. As a rule of thumb, the greater the wrong, the stronger the effort to deny it!

If we apply this rejection tendency to climate change, we see that people whose current lives depend on fossil fuels, on synthetic chemicals and other heavily carbon-emitting industries, on long-haul transport and tourism and the suchlike, are unlikely to be in the vanguard of any movement towards a zero carbon world.

In Wales, vociferous opponents of OPD remain. They find change an uncomfortable concept, and they include many with a tendency to downplay the dangers of global heating, to prefer sheep and cattle farming over the horticultural basis of many OPDs, and to assume that Life As We Have Known It can continue far into the future.


[1] The Farmland Market, Savills, January 2022, p.6.

[2] Data from the World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS, accessed March 31st 2022.

[3] ‘How the Extent of County Farms has Halved in Forty Years’, by Guy Shrubsole for Who Owns England, June 8th 2018. https://whoownsengland.org/2018/06/08/how-the-extent-of-county-farms-has-halved-in-40-years/, accessed March 31st 2022.


Mammoth Landholdings: The Kleptogarchy part 23

Mammoth Landholdings

The 20 largest landowners[1] in the UK own more than 11% of the entire land area. Just the top five possess over 8%. They are the Forestry Commission, the Ministry of Defence, the Crown Estate, the National Trust and the National Trust for Scotland, and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. The major private landowner in 2018 was the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry, with over a quarter of a million acres, but the Danish billionaire Anders Holch Povlsen may have caught him up. Mr Povlsen, owner of clothing chain Bestseller and the largest shareholder in fashion company ASOS, is a dedicated rewilder and acquires land to return it to its natural state. There are eight individuals and family holdings in the largest 20, including five ancient dukedoms – Buccleuch and Queensberry, Atholl, Westminster, Cornwall and Beaufort.

Mammoth landholdings are built up through conquests, advantageous marriages, favourable laws, and deference among the landless classes, who are often fed the thought that if only they worked hard and achieved financial success, they too could join the landed gentry. Hard work is not inevitably the route to landed proprietorship. Financial riches accompany birth in or marriage into affluent families, luck in speculation, or genius in invention. Wealth brings land, homes, trust funds, and influence to protect ownership of these and other assets into the future. Social reformers or agitators, depending on your point of view, protested against the privatisation of the countryside, but with very little success. In the 19th century radicals like Herbert Spencer referred to the removal of land rights as a crime:

“It may by-and-by be perceived that equity utters dictates to which we have not yet listened; and men may then learn that to deprive others of their rights to the use of the earth is to commit a crime inferior only in wickedness to the crime of taking away their lives or personal liberties.”[2]

Spencer reasoned that access to land is an inalienable right, a viewpoint that most politicians of the time disregarded. And still do. Communist revolutions in the 20th century led to land nationalisations notably in the USSR, China and North Korea, but control lay not with the farm workers but with the government chain of command. The changes by and large did not benefit the rural proletariat. In China between 1958 and 1961 over 15 million died of starvation, perhaps up to 55 million. Stalin’s enforced collectivisation led to severe famine in Ukraine, where maybe four million died. Cuba collectivised too after the 1959 revolution, but private farmers were able to hold up to 160 acres each, and independent co-operatives involved all members in decision-making. This model would surely have achieved greater prosperity had it not been for the continuing embargo by the United States, starving the island nation of funds for investment.

While wholesale land nationalisation is unlikely to succeed because it is too dramatic, too divisive, there need to be routes into farming for newcomers whose families are not landowners. In the UK, now separated from the European Union, the exorbitant price of rural land is a steep barrier. Land is a tax shelter if it is farmed or has commercially managed woodland on it. Favourable tax treatment generally extends to the farmhouse too, and to cottages even if they are let, provided the letting business is subsidiary to the land-based activities.

The argument for exempting farmland from Inheritance Tax, particularly, is so that farmers can leave their acres and buildings to their legatees without also leaving a bill for up to 40% of everything above £325,000. While favourable to existing farmers, the policy does nothing immediate to encourage aspiring new entrants, whose problems are summarised by the Access to Land Network:

“New entrants in the UK face a range of problems in relation to land that are exacerbated by the UK’s highly priced and unregulated land market. Typically (although not always), the demand from new entrants is for smallholdings as entering on a small scale can allow an individual to test a business model and slowly build markets.

— Land prices prohibit new entrants from buying land

— The lack of a comprehensive land registry means it is difficult to identify owners

— Land in rural areas is often not advertised, so without family or community connections new entrants find it hard to access ‘word of mouth’ opportunities

— New entrants often start out on very small areas of land limiting the potential to earn a sustainable livelihood

— Smaller areas of land are often more expensive

— New entrants tend to look for land in their own locality, due to lack of funds to move, or dependency on alternative (or partner’s) incomes.

— Local authority land in rural areas is managed along very conservative lines so new entrants with alternative plans (organic, CSA, niche markets) are not taken seriously

— Lack of affordable housing in rural areas is a major issue for new entrants (indeed for farmers generally).[3]

Planning law in England, particularly, has a presumption against ‘development’ in the countryside. This presumption, combined with the chronic shortage of affordable homes, limits the creation of new farms. The restrictive regulations also work against farmers who want to retire but stay living on the land, because it is often a costly and complicated process to obtain permission to build a new home for the successor farmer. There used to be old farm buildings suitable for conversion, but few remain. They have been converted for alternative uses under official farm diversification policies.


[1] The compilation of landholdings is from a list drawn up by abcfinance.co.uk and cross-referenced. https://abcfinance.co.uk/blog/who-owns-the-uk/, accessed January 27th 2022.

[2] ‘The Right to Use the Earth’ p.143 in Social Statics by Herbert Spencer, 1865, D Appleton & Co, New York.

[3] ‘The United Kingdom’ by Rachel Harries and Tom Carman, in Europe’s New Farmers, Access to Land Network, September 2018. https://www.accesstoland.eu/Access-to-land-for-new-entrants, accessed April 27th 2022.


Landless Billions: The Kleptogarchy part 22

English nursery rhyme, about 1764. Kleptocrats have been with us for a very long time!

Land is the foundation of resilience. Most people cannot be fully resilient because they do not have any land. One of the few countries where government is trying to resettle people back on the land is Cuba, where individuals can own and bequeath up to 65 hectares as long as they continue to farm it. But there’s a labour shortage, saline water ingress near the coasts, infestations of thorny Marabu shrubs, droughts and hurricanes, and ancient farm machinery held together on a wing and a prayer.

On our planet now, the majority of people are crammed into tiny spaces: by 2020 more than 55% of Earth’s population were squashed into cities, while huge private estates extend over thousands of acres, up to 14,000 square miles in the case of the Anna Creek cattle station in South Australia. No surprise that people in power sanctify personal property – it’s happened through history. Powerful people take land from less powerful ones, as the ‘steals the common from the goose’ nursery rhyme laments. That’s always been the case, and population pressure leads to greater competition. Yet our collective future demands a more equitable distribution of land, so that families can become more resilient and produce more of their own needs.

The history of my own family shows the impact of external events on access to land. The ancestors I know about who lived before the Industrial Revolution were prosperous in the main. In the case of my father’s paternal line, two early deaths changed everything. William Dod(d) was a vintner in the mid 17th century, a Citizen of London, married to Francis Clarke whose brother Cornelius was High Sheriff of Derbyshire after the restoration of the monarchy to King Charles II. William lived in style in Kingstreete, Westminster, paying a rent of £100 a year, equivalent to over £20,000 a year in 2020, for a house with 16 hearths.[1] A labourer in London in 1675 would earn about 20 pennies a day, about £103 a year in 2020 money: inequality is nothing new, nor is precariousness. William died in 1675 leaving three children aged 7, 3 and 6 months. As they were all minors (and women did not count), most of his assets disappeared into the Court of Orphans, which was sliding into bankruptcy. John, the eldest of the surviving children – an older sister, Elizabeth, died in infancy – married Mary Crannage in 1689 when he was 21 and they already had a baby son, William. Their second son Cornelius appeared in 1690, and in 1692 John died. The Court of Orphans had collapsed, Mary was on her own and London was expensive, so the little family moved to a small farm in Essex, Dial House at Birds Green, Willingale Doe. They could be called downshifters, escapees to the country with what was left of their town resources. There Cornelius stayed, farming 45 acres according to a survey in 1734, and his descendants remained for around 150 years until the farming disaster that unfolded after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. From 1815 to 1846, tariff walls protected British grain crops from price competition. Great for farmers, awful for the landless who struggled to afford food. Cornelius Dodd, my great-great-great-grandfather, was a farmer and publican in Essex in 1841 but in 1851, after the repeal of the Corn Laws, he is described in the census as ‘farmer out of business’ and was in Surrey County Prison for debt. He became a brewer, and that is how he supported his family until he died in 1878. His only child William was never a farmer in his own right. William, born in 1827, was a bailiff in 1851, a haulier in 1861, and by 1891 he was a confectioner in Shepherds Bush, London, living with his wife Mary, their youngest daughter Amanda and two of their son William Matthew’s boys. William Matthew emigrated to Australia, but that’s another story.

William’s eldest son Charles was a carpenter, his son Cyril rented a smallholding in Chertsey in 1934, and his son, my father Lionel, bought a farm of his own in 1956, with a loan from mum’s brother-in-law George Stanford, a dairy farmer with a milk pasteurisation plant and a milk delivery business. It was pure luck that mum had a brother-in-law able and willing to provide a loan.

Bad luck killed vintner William in 1675, bad luck saw his assets pass into the ‘protection’ of the Court of Orphans, bad luck left his grandchildren William and Cornelius orphans as babies. Four generations later, it may well have been bad luck that prevented farmer Cornelius from meeting his debts after the repeal of the Corn Laws. But it was good luck for mum and dad that George had the wherewithal for them to buy a farm.

I had another great-great-grandfather who lost his farm in Victorian England. Solomon Crowhurst was born in 1819 in Ash, Kent, and at the 1861 census was farming 34 acres at Hodsell Street, Ash, living with his wife Harriet, children Mary and George, and employing two labourers and a boy. By 1881 he was a servant and ostler in The Vigo Inn, Stansted, near Malling in Kent. He died in North Aylesford Union Workhouse on February 13th 1895, aged 78. No old age pensions in those days; if you had no money and either no children, or children who could not look after you, you went into a workhouse.

Solomon’s daughter Mary Ann married Thomas Warinton, whose astute daughter-in-law Lavinia probably helped persuade her son-in-law George to make a loan to her other son-in-law Lionel.

When did markets in land develop? For thousands of years, humans wandered, seeking sustenance. In the 21st century (according to Christian counting) land is essentially private property. In what is now the United Kingdom, the first codified record of land ownership that has come down to us is the Domesday Book, completed 20 years after the Norman invasion of 1066. King William I seized vast tracts of land for himself and his followers, creating a pattern of landed estates that has characterised English society to this day. By the 19th century concentration of land ownership had become a hot political issue. The 1861 census indicated that there were just 30,000 landowners in the population of 30 million, wrote J V Beckett in ‘The Pattern of Landownership in England and Wales, 1660-1800’.[2] This was apparently incorrect: doubts over the accuracy of the census led to a new survey, the Return of Owners of Land, in 1872-73, which found that just 7,000 or so landowners possessed four-fifths of the total acreage, but also that more than one million people owned some land. Between the mid-17th and mid-19th centuries, roughly, law had a bigger impact than money on landholdings. Owners often entailed their property on their closest male heir, to avoid the splitting up of estates. In addition, Parliament was controlled by landowners, who enlarged their estates by Acts of Parliament permitting them to enclose land classed as common, i.e. without a recorded owner, but used by local communities to provide food and fuel. Beckett commented that “if the magnates were increasing their acreage someone had to suffer, and the corollary to large estates was seen to be the expropriation of the small owner “.[3] Landowners who did not want to be bothered with day-to-day management let their estate farms to tenants, who formed a substantial stratum of the rural population in England and Wales for around 200 years, some making the switch to ownership when high death taxes led to forced sales. Death taxes peaked at 85% on sums over £750,000 in 1969, subject to a maximum take of 80% of an estate’s total value. Labour was in power, Harold Wilson was Prime Minister, and Rupert Murdoch started buying UK newspapers. Elevated death tax rates, high since the late 1940s, encouraged landowners to create trusts and companies as tax shelters, and no subsequent government has tried such aggressive wealth redistribution. Progress towards a more equal pattern of wealth ownership on the island of Great Britain happened between the end of the First World War and the era of Margaret Thatcher, slowly until 1945 and then rapidly, but since the late 1980s/ early 1990s, the process has reversed.[4] Between April 2018 and March 2020 the richest 1% of the UK population owned more than the least wealthy 80% combined. [5]

While many in the 1% can afford to dabble in the land market, most in the 80% cannot. The price of land in the United Kingdom became divorced from its likely economic return during the 18th century, when the rise of capitalism and alternative investments – whether in mines, factories, transport, money-lending, speculative housing, wealth extraction from colonies, and so on – meant that the nouveau riche were looking for estates to bring them social standing. By the 1860s, Beckett concluded, “it was only incomers from the business world who could afford to purchase” the estates that came onto the market.[6]

The differences between families and classes are profound. Members of individual families move up, down and across the social spectrum, from one class to another. Good luck, bad luck, it’s a game of snakes and ladders, more of a game of chance than we are encouraged to recognise. The greater the distance between the most and least affluent, the less mingling there is between the extremes, and this helps families with large landholdings to retain them. Classes are more stable socially than individuals in families. The ruling class, whether composed of kings, aristocrats, plutocrats, oligarchs, theocrats, or any other -arch or -crat, remains. Revolutions may change the personnel and the source of their authority, but in nearly all complex societies, power is a force appropriated by a hierarchy. Soviet Russia was supposed to be a people’s state but the people were still bossed around, and in Stalin’s time maybe seven million to over nine million inhabitants of Mother Russia died because of repression, cruel policies and Stalin’s persecution complex.


[1] Inflation calculator from the Bank of England. Labourers’ wages from ‘The pay of labourers and unskilled men on London building sites, 1660–1770’ by Judy Stephenson, https://www.academia.edu/23668168/The_pay_of_labourers_and_unskilled_men_on_London_building_sites_1660_1770, re-accessed July 4th 2022.

[2] In The Economic History Review, second series Vol.37, No.1, February 1984, pps.1-22.

[3] Ibid p.2.

[4] The History of Inequality: the Deep-Acting Ideological and Institutional Influences, by Simon Szreter, Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2021. https://ifs.org.uk/inequality/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/IFS-Deaton-Review-The-history-of-inequality-1.pdf, accessed June 13th 2022.

[5] ‘Household Total Wealth in Great Britain: April 2018 to March 2020’, Office for National Statistics, January 7th 2022. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/bulletins/totalwealthingreatbritain/april2018tomarch2020#:~:text=The%20wealthiest%2010%25%20of%20households,of%20%C2%A315%2C400%20or%20less, accessed June 13th 2022.

[6] Ibid p.15


Henry George and the Campaign to Tax Land

Modern ideas about taxing land are not so modern after all, but old ideas resurfacing.

Take Land Value Tax. Now, many people will know this, but I did not. There is a movement called Georgism, after the 19th century American economist Henry George. Born in Philadelphia in September 1839, his works include the blockbuster multi-million seller Progress and Poverty, published in 1879. In Republican red US states today he could well be labelled abusively as a communist, so far towards individualism has much popular opinion swung, or been persuaded to swing.

Henry George, 1839-1897. Photo from Wikipedia

The 19th century saw massive wealth disparities on both sides of the Atlantic. In the States, Henry George argued that rents for land should be socialized by taxing it. He wrote in Progress and Poverty that “I do not propose either to purchase or to confiscate private property in land. The first would be unjust; the second, needless. Let the individuals who now hold it still retain, if they want to, possession of what they are pleased to call their land. Let them buy and sell, and bequeath and devise it. We may safely leave them the shell, if we take the kernel. It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent.”  *

He also proposed that utilities should be publicly owned and not operated for profit. A debate between Henry George and Margaret Thatcher, had they lived at the same time, would have been explosive. It was Mrs Thatcher who ushered in the Great Privatisation of the United Kingdom, encouraging the public to buy small shareholdings in the hope of making them mini-capitalists. Here is Wikipedia’s extensive list of UK privatisations in the 1980s:

It was too much for former Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan to stomach. In a speech on November 8th 1985 Macmillan, resident in 10 Downing Street from 1957 to 1963, castigated the policy as “selling off the family silver”, i.e. a step on the descent to Carey Steet. The ‘nation of shareholders’ never happened, as many who took part eagerly in the privatisations sold their shares soon afterwards. It was an intermediated transfer from the public to private institutions. (At least, there were intermediaries, unlike later incipient scandals of direct transfers from government funds to businesses with Party connections, as with certain pandemic contracts for personal protective equipment.)

Henry George’s ideas have been out of popular fashion in his native USA more or less since he died in 1897, reflecting hostility to taxation and the view that socialism is unfair to hard-working rugged individualists. Could he be coming back into fashion? There is an active Henry George Foundation, based in London, https://www.henrygeorgefoundation.org/. The foundation publishes the journal Land and Liberty, which aims to “explore how our common wealth should be used – and to demonstrate that this is the key to building the bridge of sustainability between private life, the public sector and our resources – between the individual, the community and the environment. It aims to put the laws of nature and people at the heart of economics.” Land and Liberty can be viewed on the foundation’s website – do take a look. The foundation is on Twitter as well, @henrygeorgeuk.

* George, Henry (1879). Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of WealthVIII. New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation. ISBN 0-914016-60-1

PDR


Free trade and exploitation: the distress of Guatemala

No population can survive without food, therefore it is a strong argument that governments should prioritise secure food supplies.

Free-trade food policies are based on the belief that food should come from areas of the world that can produce it at the lowest immediate cost. Detrimentally for our future, the lowest immediate cost takes no account of environmental degradation, or fossil energy or water depletion, or the livelihoods of small-scale farmers who are affected by globalised food chains. The proponents of free trade generally claim that tariff barriers and financial support schemes which protect farmers in the affluent world mean that farmers in ‘developing’ countries cannot compete successfully, despite their lower labour costs. Yet small-scale farmers in Africa, Latin America and Asia are the last to benefit from free trade. The cash benefits go to large farmers and corporations, for planting crops for export rather than food crops for local consumption.

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Guatemala’s volcanic soils have the potential to feed the 14.4 million population, but much of the best land is foreign-owned, and revenues leave the country.

Guatemala in Central America is a stunning country, both for its memorable peoples and landscapes, and for the corruption of its governments down the years. The indigenous peoples continue to suffer from domination by a tiny number of foreign corporations and their local political enforcers.

I spent six weeks in Guatemala in autumn 2007, staying with a family and helping out at a UK-funded school, Escuela Proyecto La Esperanza, in Jocotenango. On Friday October 12th 2007 I was part of a small group travelling to the Mayan ruins at Tikal, in the forests of the Petén. We had to cross Guatemala City, which I remember for ubiquitous McDonalds; Esso, Shell and Texaco filling stations; and high-rise American hotels, encircled by tin-roofed shacks, unfriendly streets, potholes, rubbish and guns.

We followed the CA9 highway north-east out of Guatemala City to El Progreso, Rio Hondo and Quirigua, where there are intricate Maya carvings. Quirigua is in the Motagua river valley, which reaches the Caribbean at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala’s only significant port on the Caribbean.

Most of the valley land is owned by corporations, with fruit plantations and horticultural crops for export, the latter protected by acre upon acre of plastic. The bananas are plastic-protected too, encased in perforated blue plastic to protect against rain, dust and wind. What a lot of plastic to replace when the oil runs out. At Quirigua the plantations belong to Chiquita Brands — descendent of the infamous United Fruit Company — and to Del Monte.

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Banana plantation in the Motagua valley, owned by Chiquita Brands International of the USA.

North from the Motagua valley through the Petén to the ruined Maya city of Tikal, we passed a succession of shiny new evangelical protestant churches (financed from the USA), set in decrepit villages. The farms visible from the road were either under two hectares or vast, containing much unused land. Most of the land north of the little town of Frontera, where the Lago de Izabal narrows into the Caribbean-bound Rio Dulce, is controlled by a handful of powerful families. They used to run cattle, tended by local labourers, but since the road was hard-surfaced in the years around 2000, the labourers have migrated away, to the slums of Guatemala City and as illegals to the USA.

Staying overnight in Finca Ixobel, a country guesthouse owned by an American widow whose Guatemalteco husband was assassinated by a death squad in the ‘civil war’ between 1960 and 1996, in which some 200,000 people died or ‘disappeared’, I read in Revue magazine for June 2007 that over a fifth of the population, 21%, have to exist on less than $1 (59p) a day, and well over half the people, 58%, subsist on less than $2 (£1.18) a day.

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Forest has reclaimed the massive stone monuments of Tikal.

The Petén is, according to Pablo, who works as a guide in Tikal, the world’s fifth largest forest reserve, and the biggest in Central America. The reserve also functions as a drugs highway. Drug runners are constantly building air strips deep in the forest for the lucrative narcotrafico, which finances grand villas behind high walls, and four-by-fours with tinted windows. Drugs are more important to the local economy than tourism, despite the presence of amazing Mayan monuments. “Each year around 150,000 visitors come to Tikal,” said Pablo. Increasingly, they fly in to Flores Airport, to avoid the hazards to life and limb in Guatemala City. Flores Airport is bringing ‘development’ to the Petén, shopping malls plonked incongruously in the rural landscape. Pablo was pessimistic. He said that poverty is increasing because subsistence farmers do not have enough land. The landlords are opposed to any process of land reform, even though their own land may lie idle. Now they are looking forward to a golden era of biofuels, a scenario in which small farmers, campesinos, do not feature. Fewer families can afford to send their children to school, and in Pablo’s view the illiteracy rate was escalating again, above the low point of 40% estimated in 2002.

In Guatemala the law of the jugular applies. There are courts, and prisons, but legal procedures are slow and uncertain, and extra-judicial killings commonplace.

The apparatus of the state in Guatemala, such as exists, is deployed to protect existing power structures. The welfare of the people comes way down this agenda: politicians and businessmen – the same people, often at the same times – have little interest in working to abolish hunger among the indigenous peoples, to provide affordable healthcare, or to create a thriving countryside where families can produce enough food for themselves and their neighbourhoods.

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Flimsy superstructures are no match for torrential rainstorms. Much housing is in tin shacks, often precariously sited on slopes.

The indigenous Maya believed that man was merely part of the natural order on Earth, a natural order that needed to remain in balance. When their practice departed calamitously from this tidy theory, their civilisation declined. The Maya loved mathematics and astronomy. Even today, Mayan children in school are fascinated by numbers and are skilful in arithmetic. Over a thousand years ago, the results of the Mayan linkage of religion with astronomy was causing catastrophe, as their huge, astronomically-aligned temples and monuments, in socially and occupationally complex cities, absorbed too much of their collective energy, and demanded too much food, fuel and construction materials from the rural hinterlands. The forest was felled.

As resources dwindled, Mayan tribes fought intense wars to try and seize as much as they could of the remaining food and water. The knock-out blow at Tikal was a 30-year drought around 1000AD. The occupants of Tikal walked away, and many of their descendants – still poverty-stricken — live in the western highlands of Guatemala, on steep, infertile land which the European families and the multinational corporations have not wanted.

The relationship between trees and human survival is too often overlooked, ignored. Jared Diamond, in Collapse: how societies choose to fail or survive[i] points out that forests

“….function as the world’s major air filter removing carbon monoxide and other air pollutants, and forests and their soils are a major sink for carbon, with the result that deforestation is an important driving force behind global warming by decreasing that carbon sink. Water transpiration from trees returns water to the atmosphere, so that deforestation tends to cause diminished rainfall and increased desertification. Trees retain water in the soil and keep it moist. They protect the land surface against landslides, erosion, and sediment runoff into streams. Some forests, notably tropical rainforests, hold the major portion of an ecosystem’s nutrients, so that logging and carting the logs away tends to leave the cleared land infertile.”

— Diamond 2005, p.469 in 2006 Penguin edition

This is what happened at Tikal. and in exploited lands all over the world, from Norse Greenland to Haiti in the Caribbean, from Easter Island in the Pacific to Rwanda in Africa. Deforestation ends societies, even civilisations.

Once free of human interference, the jungle returned to Tikal and clothed the monuments, which slept undisturbed for centuries, while the Mayans were conquered and later dragged unwillingly into a capitalist economy.

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Culture and tradition often count for a lot more than consumer purchases. The blouses, huipils, are home-woven, and each village has its own designs.

Mayans are relatively indifferent to consumer culture, a ‘failing’ which annoys foreign entrepreneurs:

“An enormous disadvantage for this country is that the Indians [the Mayans] won’t work more than just enough to fill their basic needs, and these are very few. The only way to make [a Mayan] work is to advance him money, then he can be forced to work. Very often, they run off, but they are caught and punished very severely.”

— from the story of a German who emigrated to Guatemala in 1892, told in Daniel Wilkinson’s Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal and Forgetting in Guatemala, p.38.[ii]

This German immigrant, Friedrich Endler, ran a coffee plantation. The plantations struggled to find enough labour, so the government instituted a form of slavery, the labour draft. Daniel Wilkinson explains this system in Silence on the Mountain, a moving and tragic analysis of Guatemala in the 20th century:

“The labor drafts. Upon the request of a plantation owner, the governors of each department would round up a work gang of fifty to one hundred Indians and send them to work on the plantation. An 1894 law provided Indians with one way to escape this form of forced recruitment: become an indebted worker for a plantation.”

— Silence on the Mountain p.76-77.

The pass laws, so hated in South Africa later in the 20th century, already existed in Guatemala:

 “ ‘We were slaves because of the law of Ubico,’ recalled the next elderly peasant we talked to. He was referring to President Jorge Ubico, who had governed the country from 1930 to 1944, and the ‘slavery’ he described was not debt peonage but the vagrancy laws that had replaced it. ‘We had to carry a booklet, like an identity card, which showed what plantation we worked in and how many hours we had worked that year. If you didn’t carry it, the government could jail you and make you work without pay’.”

Silence on the Mountain p.97.

Land is at the heart of the unhappy history of Guatemala. Immigrants with access to capital claimed it. Government was for them, not for the Mayans, and there was no question of prioritising rights for the indigenous peoples above rights for plantation owners to obtain as much profit as possible. The landowners have benefited financially from colonisation and its successor, free trade, because they have deliberately marginalised the indigenous peoples.

by Pat Dodd Racher

 

[i] London and New York: Allen Lane and Viking Penguin, 2005.

[ii] Silence on the Mountain was published in 2004 by Duke University Press.